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Abstract. Increasingly, physicians’ payment schemes are being reformed to en- 
hance performance and to ensure an optimal allocation of scarce medical resources. 
The empirical evidence points towards the use of mixed payment schemes that 
appear better at achieving efficiency than either lump sum payments (such as cap- 
itation) or piece rates (fee for service). Yet, this alleged superiority remains to be 
established from a theoretical standpoint. The Principal-Agent model developed 
in this paper offers a contribution in this line, with a primary care physician as 
agent and a public regulator as principal. Alternative specifications of the princi- 
pal’s objective function are considered in the model (efficiency versus fairness). 
Uncertainty is introduced by two random variables that represent the probability 
for an individual of being ill and his productivity parameter which determines the 
amount of resources (the physician’s effort in particular) necessary to restore health. 
The relationship is characterised by information asymmetry since the physician is 
assumed to observe both variables after the contract has been signed, but before 
choosing his effort level. Both selection and moral hazard issues are addressed 
in the model and the results show that, under GP risk neutrality, mixed payment 
schemes fully correct for both types of information asymmetry. 
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